Six States, One Critical Waterway

The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman — share one overwhelming geographic and economic fact: their prosperity is inseparably linked to the Strait of Hormuz. Through this narrow passage flows the oil and gas revenue that has funded decades of development across the Gulf. Any sustained disruption would be economically catastrophic for every GCC state.

Yet despite this shared interest, the GCC has never operated as a truly unified bloc on Hormuz-related issues. Understanding why reveals much about the complexity of Gulf regional politics.

Diverging Relationships with Iran

The most fundamental division within GCC approaches to the Strait is the range of relationships member states maintain with Iran. These relationships exist on a spectrum:

  • Saudi Arabia: Historically the most adversarial relationship with Iran. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is rooted in sectarian, ideological, and geopolitical competition for regional influence. Saudi Arabia has been willing to support a strong US military presence partly as a counterweight to Iranian power.
  • UAE: A complex relationship shaped by significant economic links (particularly through Dubai's trade with Iran) alongside territorial disputes over the island claims in the Strait itself. The UAE has in recent years strengthened security ties with Western powers while managing economic engagement with Tehran.
  • Qatar: Has historically maintained a more conciliatory approach to Iran, partly out of geographic and energy necessity — Qatar shares the world's largest natural gas field (the North Field/South Pars) with Iran across a maritime boundary in the Gulf.
  • Oman: Perhaps the most distinct GCC position. Oman has traditionally maintained open channels with Iran and has repeatedly served as a back-channel between Iran and Western powers. Muscat's coastline borders the Strait directly, giving Oman both physical proximity and a strong interest in reducing tensions.
  • Bahrain and Kuwait: Both broadly aligned with Saudi Arabia on Iran policy, though Kuwait has also historically maintained pragmatic economic ties with Tehran.

The 2017–2021 Qatar Crisis: A Fracture Exposed

The intra-GCC dispute over Qatar — in which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar from 2017 to 2021 — illustrated how deeply the Council's unity can fracture. During the blockade, Qatar's reliance on Iranian airspace and the Strait for its own LNG exports became an acute strategic reality. The crisis underscored that GCC solidarity cannot be assumed, even when Strait stability is at stake.

The Al-Ula Declaration of January 2021 ended the blockade, but the underlying disagreements about regional strategy, relationships with Turkey and Iran, and the appropriate pace of political change have not been fully resolved.

The Abraham Accords and Changing Alignments

The 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalised relations between Israel and Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Sudan, introduced a new variable into Gulf regional politics. While not directly about the Strait of Hormuz, the Accords reflected a reshaping of regional alignments in which the perceived Iranian threat played a significant role in driving Arab states toward Israel.

The potential normalisation of Saudi-Israeli relations — which remains under negotiation at various levels — would further reconfigure the regional picture, with implications for the balance of deterrence around the Strait.

Bypass Infrastructure as Sovereign Risk Management

Individual GCC states have invested in infrastructure to reduce their dependence on the Strait, which itself reflects the limits of collective security arrangements:

  • Saudi Arabia's Petroline pipeline to the Red Sea
  • The UAE's ADCOP pipeline to Fujairah
  • Qatar's geographic position, which means its LNG tankers must pass through the Strait — the country has no viable bypass

These investments represent individual sovereign decisions to hedge against Strait disruption — a tacit acknowledgment that collective GCC frameworks may not be sufficient to guarantee security in a crisis.

The Saudi-Iran Rapprochement

The Chinese-brokered restoration of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations in 2023 introduced a genuinely new element to the regional picture. Whether this détente will hold, and whether it will reduce tensions around the Strait, remains to be seen. Historically, Saudi-Iranian relations have oscillated between periods of engagement and confrontation. The structural rivalries that drive their competition have not been resolved — only, for the moment, managed.

For the Strait of Hormuz, any sustained reduction in Saudi-Iranian hostility would reduce the risk of proxy conflicts that could spill over into the waterway — a development that would benefit every GCC state and the global energy market equally.